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I. Introduction 
 The criminal justice system, first developed over hundreds of years ago, was put in place 
to protect, punish, and offer retribution for victims. While maintaining safety and security, it has 
been assigned the task of creating laws or ‘criminal codes’ in an effort to complete these vital 
functions. To fulfill the purposes of the criminal justice system, these laws must target a wide 
continuum of crimes, both on the domestic and international level. In turn, the criminal justice 
system’s ideals and purposes are manifested within international law’s response to conceivably 
the most horrendous crime on earth: genocide. Therefore, by exploring the relationship between 
the criminal justice system and genocide, much can be learned with regards to appropriately 
responding to mass atrocities. For to end genocide, international law must work to hold 
perpetrators responsible, give retribution to victims, and most importantly, strive to protect the 
world from future mass atrocities.  
 There are a number of strategies that can be implemented by the international community 
in the furtherance of the overall goal of preventing and responding to genocide. These include 
sanctions, military action, public outcry, divestment, and criminal indictments, to name a few. 
While each has notable pros and cons with regards to their effectiveness in preventing and 
responding to mass atrocities; depending on the particular circumstances, criminal prosecution 
plays an especially critical role in the process. International law lays the groundwork for how 
mass atrocities, such as genocide, will be dealt with, and in turn, what the international 
community’s responsibility is with regards to prevention and response. In turn, as international 
law has developed over the years, its’ ability to respond to crimes threatening global peace and 
security has become paramount in combating genocide.  
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 In turn, the recent indictment by the international court against Sudan’s President Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity, offers a current application and 
analysis of the role of international law in prevention and response to mass atrocities. The 
examination of the indictment of the Sudanese President, for his role in the ongoing violence 
occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan, presents pertinent insight into the critical task 
international law has in holding perpetrators of mass atrocities responsible and deterring future 
atrocities from occurring. While international law is by no means a cure-all to ending mass 
atrocities and requires cooperation from the States, it lays the vital framework for the 
international community to follow in an effort to end conflicts and deter future crimes. Overall, 
the criminal justice system, more specifically international law, is one of the world’s greatest 
assets and needs to be better understood and utilized in combating genocide. 
 This article proceeds in three parts. Part II introduces a background on genocide, 
analyzing the question of what is genocide and the worldwide impact of international law and 
genocide. Part III further reveals the role of international law in prevention and response to mass 
atrocities. This section describes international law’s overall purpose and function and its’ 
effectiveness in carrying out these roles. Part IV focuses on the case study of President Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan. This section presents background on the ongoing mass 
atrocities occurring in Darfur and international law’s recent response to the situation. The case 
study offers a fitting backdrop in applying and revealing the vital functions international law 
plays in prevention and response to genocide.   
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II. Background on Genocide 
A. What is Genocide? 
 “Genocide” was first termed in 1944 by Polish law professor, Raphael Lemkin. The term 
was constructed through the combination of the Greek genos (race or tribe) with the Latin cide 
(killing). Lemkin first introduced the following definition of genocide in the doctrine of 
international law,  
 [A] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
 foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
 themselves… Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions 
 involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members 
 of the national group (Nersessian, 2007, p. 243).  
 
The Nuremburg Trials’, which prosecuted prominent members of the political, military, and 
economic leadership of Nazi Germany, indictment of the major war criminals and the closing 
arguments of the British and French prosecutor provided one of the first references to the crime 
of genocide in international law (Nersessian, 2007, p. 244). Although only war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and crimes against peace were included in the final judgment at Nuremburg, 
the indictment and other proceeding references to genocide were descriptive in nature. It was not 
until the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
in 1948 that the new legal terminology, genocide, was no longer treated as a subset of crimes 
against humanity. Identifying genocide as an international crime, the Convention defines the 
term as: 
 [A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
 national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its  
       physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
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 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Satkauskas, 2005, p. 
 400).  
 
Currently, international law continues to define the crime of genocide as described in the 1948 
Genocide Convention.  
 While largely apparent from its’ definition, genocide is an international crime and 
concern for two main reasons: the special intent required and the extremely serious injury it 
strives to inflict. Therefore, since it is an inchoate offense, international law can respond to the 
criminal violation of genocide as soon as it starts, even if injury has not become evident. As 
stated by David Nersessian (2007), a lecturer on Law at the Boston University School of Law, 
this is because “offender’s malevolent intent and an underlying act against group members” is all 
that is needed for genocide to become an international matter (p. 263). Yet, despite the fact that 
genocide has been deemed an international matter, thus far, the United Nations (UN) has been 
ineffective in preventing or ending multiple cases of mass atrocities including, Rwanda, Kosovo, 
Cambodia, and Darfur, making the further development of international law of critical 
importance. 
B. Worldwide Impact of International Law and Genocide 
 Since the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948, international law has seen a 
number of positive developments in the establishment of international criminal tribunals to back 
the Convention’s terms.  The foremost includes the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
in 1994, which were put in place to prevent and punish genocide. Since Nuremberg, these 
tribunals mark the first time that the international community has brought forth and held 
accountable those responsible for genocide. In addition, a permanent international criminal 
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tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2003. The ratification of the 
ICC further builds upon the Genocide Convention in that,  
 By joining the ICC, 1) additional countries have accepted that genocide and other mass   
 atrocities are international matters, 2) once ratifying the Rome Statue, which created the 
 ICC, States must enforce the international rule of law within their own borders and if they 
 fail, agree that the ICC can intervene, and 3) the ICC provides domestic punishment 
 against genocide and other crimes under international law (Chung, 2008, p. 228-229). 
 
In addition to the cases of human right abuses mentioned earlier, these tribunals have been faced 
with the task of responding to mass atrocities in Angola, Burma, Somalia, Indonesia, Chile, 
Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Iraq, to name a few. 
 While international law has developed over the years, there is one large problem that it 
continues to face in its’ response to genocide: the conflict between respect for state sovereignty 
and peace among States, and the protection of basic human rights (Critchlow, 2009). To resolve 
this conflict, international law looked to the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) to address and develop policy on the issue of humanitarian intervention. 
The group produced a report titled, “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The report’s central theme, 
R2P, has two key elements:  
 1) that each State has a responsibility to protect its’ populations from genocide, war 
 crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; and 2) that the international 
 community has a responsibility to protect populations from these same human rights 
 violations (Critchlow, 2009, p. 328). 
 
 Overall, the report clearly states that sovereignty should not be viewed as a legitimate defense 
by the international community against vital humanitarian intervention. Combined, the principles 
of R2P and the Genocide Convention lay the groundwork for combating genocide through 
international law like never before. They create the potential for a partnership between States and 
international law to actively work toward effectively responding to genocide rather than waiting 
until the violence has run its’ course. While, currently, this partnership remains obscure at best, 
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further understanding of the functions and purposes of international law in response to genocide 
will shed light on the importance of this relationship.  
 
III. Background on International Law 
A. Functions and Purposes of International Law 
 Before the relationship between response and prevention of genocide and international 
law can be explored, the overall functions and purposes of criminal law must be examined. There 
are two main functions of criminal law: 1) deciding the offender’s criminality in relation to the 
offense they are charged with, and 2) rating the seriousness of the crime, ensuring that the 
punishment fits the crime. International law has similar functions. Due to the fact that the 
International Criminal System’s (ICJ) main focus is mass atrocities, they are tasked with the 
responsibility of holding perpetrators responsible in numerous situations that may or may not 
constitute as genocide. For example, the ICTY was “established for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Bibas & Burke-White, 
2010, p. 8). Likewise, the preamble which founded the ICC states that, “the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished . . .” (Bibas & 
Burke-White, 2010, p. 9). In turn, the tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and the ICC have 
developed procedures that give little regard to speed and efficiency, but instead focus on 
procedural regularity and finding the truth. This is in line with the ICJ’s concern in determining 
an offender’s criminality in extremely grave and vicious crimes. Overall, prosecutions through 
the international procedure not only denounce and condemn crimes, but also answer the public’s 
call for justice against political and military leaders that contributed to the atrocities.  
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C. International Law’s Effectiveness 
 The effectiveness of international law in fulfilling its’ functions and purposes as 
described above can be debated. According to Stephanos Bibas and William Burke-White 
(2010), both Professors of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, many scholars 
describe international criminal law as “uncoordinated, and perhaps even ineffective” (p. 16). Yet 
recently, more courts have begun to enforce international criminal law. Courts at the 
international level established by international treaties or by the U.N. Security Council include: 
the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, and the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). While only 
limited to the most serious crimes, these international courts have jurisdiction over half of the 
world’s countries and over one-third of the population on earth (Bibas & Burke-White, 2010). In 
turn, due to its’ vast jurisdiction, international law has the ability to play a large role in granting 
restorative justice throughout the world.  
 While international law plays an important role in restorative justice, it also has the 
ability to individually hold those responsible for atrocities accountable. Sascha Bachmann 
(2009), a researcher of international law in general with a focus on international criminal law and 
international human rights law, argues that the necessary deterrence of human rights violators 
can be attained through an individual accountability system. This is supported by the,  
 “Opening address of the US Chief Prosecutor Jackson before the International Military 
 Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals (IMT) of Nuremberg: ‘Crimes against 
 international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
 individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of  international law be 
 enforced’” (Bachmann, 2009, p.75). 
 
 Yet, despite the establishment of the Military Tribunal of Nuremburg in 1946, in which the idea 
of individual criminal responsibility was first recognized as part of international law, it was not 
viewed as a “guiding principle” in criminal law for many years. It was not until the 1990’s that 
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further development of the doctrine of criminal accountability came about; first with the 
establishment of Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals; second with the increased resolve to 
prosecute international crimes; and third, with the establishment of the ICC (Bachmann, 2009).  
 With regards to the effectiveness of ICC specifically, as of June 2008, the court had only 
issued eleven arrest warrants against individuals relating to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. This is in contrast to the thousands of communications and referrals the ICC Office of 
the Prosecutor has received in its’ first five years of operation (Chung, 2008). The ICC reviews 
each referral, and then selects a small number of recommendations for investigation due to its’ 
ability to only focus on the gravest crimes. In the end, the main purpose of the ICC’s mandate, to 
seek accountability and name perpetrators promptly, is the hope that it will increase the 
likelihood that States will take advantage of the ICC’s intervention and offer assistance in ending 
the conflict and deterring further crime. Therefore, due to the ICC’s limited budget and high 
number of perpetrators, the court’s work should reinforce a global system of accountability and 
justice rather than be viewed as the sole provider of accountability.  
 
IV. Case Study- President of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir 
A. Background on Darfur 
 A current case that allows for pertinent review of the ICC’s role in responding to 
atrocious crimes is the ongoing conflict in the region of Darfur in Sudan. The conflict began over 
25 years ago when a civil war began between the Muslims of the north and the Christians of the 
south due to the imposition of Sharia law on the country by the Arab dominated leadership. This 
conflict did not end until 2002, when the 20 year civil war ended after millions were killed and 
displaced. It was during this conflict, that the current Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir came to 
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power in a non-violent coup about 21 years ago. It was in 1993, that he was officially confirmed 
as president. Currently, al-Bashir has been indicted by the ICC on five counts of crimes against 
humanity and two of war crimes for his political responsibility in the conflict occurring in 
Darfur. On July 14, 2008, he became the first sitting head of state against who the ICC has issued 
an arrest warrant.  
 The Darfur crisis began in 2003, when rebel groups in the region attacked government 
military posts in response to the neglect of the region by the regime. As a result, the government 
released a counter-insurgency that continued to grow as time wore on. According to UN 
estimates, between 2003 and 2008, approximately 300,000 people lost their lives and at least 2 
million were displaced, after begin forced to flee from their homes in Sudan’s Darfur region 
(Koelbl & Windfuhr, 2010). As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, al-Bashir has been 
accused of being responsible for the bombing of villages and having armed and paid the Arab 
militias, referred to as the Janjaweed, to murder those in the region, force them to flee, and 
systematically rape the women. While the term genocide had been used by the Bush 
Administration in reference to the ongoing atrocities occurring in Darfur, initially the ICC ruled 
there was not enough evidence to charge him with three counts of genocide. The ICC Chief 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has appealed this decision, “arguing that prosecuting al-Bashir for 
genocide does not depend exclusively on whether it could be proved that the Sudanese head of 
state had genocidal intentions” (“Bashir charge,” 2010). Yet, for the purposes of this discussion, 
the exact charges against al-Bashir are beside the point. For, merely the fact that the ICC issued 
an arrest warrant for al-Bashir allows for further study of the role international law can play in 
responding to mass atrocities in general.  
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B. International Law’s Response to al-Bashir 
 The debate over not only the effectiveness of ICC’s issuances of an arrest warrant against 
President Omar al-Bashir, but also the question of whether the ICC has the power to do so, is 
contentious. Under international norms, the ICC can prosecute citizens only of signatory states, 
not citizens of nations, such as Sudan, that are not party to the court (Rivkin & Casey, 2008). In 
addition, in 2002, the UN’s International Court of Justice upheld the notion that a country’s most 
senior officials cannot be prosecuted until the State had given its consent, something the Sudan 
Government has refused to do. Yet, despite Sudan’s claims that the ICC has no jurisdiction, the 
fact that the UN Security Council referred the individuals accused of war crimes in Darfur to the 
ICC for investigation in a 2005 UN report, has given backing to the court’s investigation in 
Darfur (Waal & Stanton, 2009). 
 With regards to the effect the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir has had on the region of 
Darfur thus far, there are a number of recent events that must be mentioned. The first is that al-
Bashir responded to the issuance of his arrest warrant by expelling 13 international aid 
organizations, accusing them of working with the ICC on the arrest warrant. Three local groups 
were also shut down (Waal & Stanton, 2009). Yet, despite this setback, on February 23, 2010 al-
Bashir signed a preliminary peace accord with the most powerful rebel group of the Darfur 
region after coming under new pressure as the ICC has decided to revise a petition to charge him 
with genocide over the killing in Darfur (Edwards, 2010). In addition, as outlined under the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which created the government of southern Sudan, the 
country’s first multiparty voting in more than 20 years has occurred this month, giving the 
people of Sudan the opportunity to elect a president, a national legislature, regional governors, 
and the leadership of the semi-automatic Sudan (Tisdall, 2010). Yet, despite these seemingly 
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positive advances in ending the atrocities occurring in Darfur, when further scrutinized, the 
current situation facing the people of Sudan becomes bleak.  
 First, reports have confirmed that violence is rising in the southern part of the country 
despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Waal & Stanton, 2009). This could lead to 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the entire country if civil war is renewed in Sudan. 
Second, according to Jerry Fowler, the president of the Save Darfur Coalition in Washington, the 
national elections that took place this month are “virtually meaningless for Darfur…because of 
unregistered, displaced populations and widespread insecurity” (LaFranchi, 2010). Lastly, with 
regards to the ICC’s actions against al-Bashir, the recent uprising in support he has received from 
diplomatic relations highlights the fact that the arrest warrant has been beneficial to Bashir, at 
least to some degree. This is supported by the fact that the Arab League and the African Union 
have come to his support and the indictment has produced for him sympathy within the 
population of Sudan. In turn, many expect al-Bashir to be confirmed as president in the elections 
that are currently occurring (Spiegel, 2010).  
  Despite these impediments, the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant against al-Bashir is a 
positive step forward, and is supported by the fact that the number of violent deaths in Darfur 
have decreased substantially since (Waal & Stanton, 2009). Overall, the arrest warrant has led to 
providing more, rather than less protection, for the people of Darfur. This is due to the fact that if 
the ICC were not to charge President Omar al-Bashir, as stated by Dr. Gregory Stanton, president 
of Genocide Watch and immediate past president of the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars, the court “would be ignoring the evidence against al-Bashir and contributing to the 
impunity that Sudan’s leaders now brazenly anticipate they will carry out” (Waal and Stanton, 
2009, p. 334). In addition, the reality that the arrest warrant has led to the Sudanese government 
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revoking the licenses of major relief organizations merely highlights the “long-term genocidal 
intent of the al-Bashir regime toward the ethnic groups in the camps” (Waal and Stanton, 2009, 
p. 335). 
C. The ICC’s Indictment of al-Bashir and the Goals of International Law 
 In turn, the indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC marks significant progress in international 
law’s overall goals of deterrence, protection of society, and the strengthening of the global 
system of justice. Since the establishment of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the ICJ has 
actively strived to put a structure into place that not only recognizes mass atrocities, but also 
prosecutes those responsible. Through the establishment of the ICC more than five years ago, the 
ICJ has advanced its’ ability to respond to conflicts throughout the world that threaten the 
security and justice of the people. Currently, the indictment of al-Bashir on charges of crimes 
against humanity and crimes against war offers a present opportunity to explore how the ICC’s 
ruling, thus far, strengthens international law and furthers its’ primary goals in combating mass 
atrocities.  
 One of the greatest goals of current international law is to end the impunity of mass 
atrocities that has continued to occur for hundreds of years. It has been over sixty years since the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention and genocide and other mass atrocities have only 
become more common in the years since. There are many reasons for this failure including: 
naked political calculations, imperfect knowledge, deference to sovereignty, and isolationism 
(Greenfield, 2008). Yet, it can be argued that potentially the most significant reason was the 
ICJ’s lack of interest in holding individual perpetrators of mass atrocities responsible. With the 
establishment of the ICC, and in turn, the greater possibility of individuals being indicted for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the ICJ has strengthened its/ ability to 
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prevent and respond to mass atrocities. The current ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the first 
by the ICC against a sitting head of state, highlights the increased importance the ICJ has placed 
on ending the impunity in which many cases of mass atrocities have been committed with.  
 The fact that many of the worst cases against humanity in the past century have been 
committed with impunity, has only encouraged more political leaders to ignore the laws of 
humanity. In turn, the current indictment of al-Bashir helps further achieve the ICJ’s goal of 
deterrence as well. While there is no guarantee that the indictment against al-Bashir will lead to 
his prosecution any time soon, the mere fact that the ICC has placed an arrest warrant out for the 
current President of Sudan speaks volumes to the ICJ’s continuing commitment to their goal to 
not only respond and punish perpetrators responsible for mass atrocities, but also prevent future 
conflicts. Furthermore, the indictment of al-Bashir is a powerful reminder to leaders of other 
States who have not signed the ICC that the UN Security Council has the authority to subject 
them to ICC jurisdiction (Waal & Stanton, 2009). For, despite the fact that Sudan has not ratified 
the Rome Statute, and therefore has not granted jurisdiction over such crimes to the ICC, 
international law has filed charges against al-Bashir. As a result of the indictment against al-
Bashir, the ICC has forced other national leaders contemplating heinous acts to think twice about 
their actions for fear of the increasing possibility that they, too, will face justice. With regards to 
the ICC’s charges against al-Bashir, Dr. Gregory Stanton stated, “the long dark age when war 
lords and dictators could commit atrocities with impunity is coming to an end” (Waal & Stanton, 
2009, p. 339).  
 The ICC’s indictment of al-Bashir also furthers international law’s goals of protection of 
society and restorative justice. While the arrest charges are only the first step in prosecuting al-
Bashir for his crimes, the ICC has intervened in an ongoing conflict in the hopes of persuading 
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States to take greater action in ending the violence. For, by issuing a warrant naming the national 
leader of Sudan, the ICC has given the international community the opportunity to press for 
execution of the warrant and potentially reduce current and further conflict in Darfur (Chung, 
2008). While the international community has been uncooperative to date in arresting al-Bashir, 
the ICC’s indictment has sent a strong message to the international community, and the people of 
Sudan, that international law is actively working to protect society and implement restorative 
justice to those whose security and peace has been seized or threatened by mass atrocities. 
Furthermore, in 2005, the issuance of ICC’s arrest warrants for the top leaders of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) persuaded leadership to begin negotiations to bring an end to the 20-
year war between the LRA and the government of Uganda. While it is unknown whether these 
individuals will face arrest and be prosecuted, the ICC’s intervention has led to several hundred 
thousand refugees returning to their homes after years of living in refugee camps (Chung, 2008).  
 While there is no perfect solution to the situation in Darfur, the indictment of President 
Omar al-Bashir is a valuable tool that not only provides a means to ending the genocide, but also 
strengthening the global system of justice. Therefore, the ICC’s arrest warrant of al-Bashir is 
indeed a step forward. In addition, history is on its’ side. For, while this is the court’s first arrest 
warrant against a sitting head of state, presidents have been indicted in other international 
tribunals before, including Slobodan Milosevic by the ICTY and Charles Taylor by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. Although each situation is different, in both of these cases, the pressure 
of indictment led to substantial advancements in the peace process and the charges helped 
opponents displace the leaders from power, and in turn, both Milosevic and Taylor “wound up 
on the chopping block” (Waal & Stanton, 2009, p. 336). 
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D. The Execution of al-Bashir’s Arrest Warrant 
 Regardless of the ICC’s future ruling on the charge of genocide against al-Bashir and the 
current spur in popularity and support he has received from the ICC’s issuance of an arrest 
warrant, with the indictment, the ICC has taken the first step in reinforcing the global system of 
justice. For, in order to advance the most difficult aim of the Genocide Convention, the 
prevention of genocide, it must seek accountability and name perpetrators of mass atrocities 
promptly. Yet, since the ICC does not have the power to carry out arrests of perpetrators, it can 
merely lay the framework and then must largely depend on the 111 States that signed the ICC to 
act on the principle of R2P and take advantage of the ICC’s intervention to aid in ending the 
conflicts and deterring further crimes. Further advancement in responding effectively to crimes 
of international magnitude is fundamentally subject to the States carrying out their part in 
holding perpetrators responsible. Therefore, the next step for international law must involve 
answering the critical question of: How is the ICC to enforce arrest warrants without state 
cooperation? For, both the logistics and political issues involved with relations between States 
and international justice are complicated matters that have yet to be significantly dealt with by 
the either the ICJ or the international community.  
 The issue of enforcing ICC’s arrest warrant against al-Bashir is further complicated by 
the fact that the case in Sudan, which is against a number of other top leaders in addition to al-
Bashir, is the first time the ICC has attempted to charge individuals from a State that has not 
signed the Roman Statute. In turn, the ICC has found themselves in uncharted waters, and further 
examination of the international community, Sudan, and the court’s role in enforcing the arrest 
warrant and holding al-Bashir responsible is critical. First, since the ICC does not have its’ own 
police force to carry out its warrants, it relies heavily on States, especially those of the 
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individuals it indicts, to enforce the court’s mandate. Thus far, the ICC’s track record in regards 
to state cooperation is:  
 Of the four people -- all Congolese warlords -- surrendered to the ICC since it came into 
 being in 2002, three were handed over by the government of the Democratic Republic of 
 Congo and one by Belgium. Seven other people indicted before [al-Bashir] are still at 
 large (Worsnip, 2009).  
 
Although it has been established that Sudan is obligated to cooperate in turning al-Bashir over to 
the ICC regardless of the fact that the country is not a member, Sudan has refused.  Also, while 
there are many UN peacekeeping troops in Sudan, the UN cannot be ordered to arrest al-Bashir 
and has stated that it will not do so unless it is mandated by the Security Council, something 
which is unlikely to occur (Worsnip, 2009). Therefore, al-Bashir faces the greatest risk of arrest 
when entering a State that is a member of the ICC. Yet, thus far, since only three out of the 
twenty-two States in the Arab world have ratified the Roman Statute and both the Arab League 
and the African Union have overtly criticized the ICC’s arrest warrant, al-Bashir has continued 
to travel and maintain diplomatic contacts with many States. To date, Sudan, the UN, and other 
States, both those that are parties to the ICC and those that are not, have been uncooperative in 
enforcing the arrest warrant.  
 In turn, if the ICC is serious about holding al-Bashir responsible, international law must 
consider a number of additional measures that could be put into place in an effort to carry out the 
arrest warrant. In general, if Sudan continues to resist cooperating with the ICC the “Security 
Council may order the interruption of Sudan’s economic and diplomatic relations and their 
means of communication and other sanctions” (DiCicco & Rojo, 2009, Execution of Warrant 
section). More specifically, a number of leading scholars have listed the following as “soft 
measures” that can be implemented when state cooperation fails: 
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 (i) The use of economic aid inducements, 
 (ii) The use of diplomatic and economic sanctions on uncooperative governments, 
 (iii) Freezing the assets of indicted war criminals, 
 (iv) Offering individual cash rewards for information or assistance leading to the  
  arrest or the conviction of indicted war criminals, 
 (v) The use of luring by deception for locating and apprehending indicted war  
          criminals, and 
 (vi) The use of military force to effectuate apprehension (Wartanian, 2005, p. 1303). 
 
While international law has the influence to implement many of these measures in order to drive 
States to comply with the ICC’s arrest warrants, the court was set up in a manner in which state 
cooperation is essential to its’ long-term success. However, when cooperation cannot be 
obtained, international law must continue to work to enforce the prosecution of perpetrators 
responsible through other means. For, international law’s foremost purpose is to protect the 
safety and security of the world, and therefore must continue to implement and develop measures 
that further this purpose with or without state cooperation.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, international law has gone to great extents to put into place tribunals to 
hold perpetrators of mass atrocities, including genocide, responsible. Nonetheless, they were not 
designed to operate unaided. Therefore, the ICJ must continue to move forward in furthering its’ 
goals to prevent and punish those that commit genocide by implementing measures in which the 
States’ role in holding these individuals responsible is enforced or other “safe measures” are 
taken.  The limited cooperation of the international community with the ICC is a critical issue the 
ICJ must address. In the end, if the ICJ wishes to maintain its’ initial structure in which state 
cooperation plays a significant role in the process of international justice, the ICJ must find new 
ways of persuading the States to do what the ICC deems necessary-- hold Bashir accountable for 
his actions and arrest him for the atrocities he is indeed responsible for.  
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